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PROPERTY
The nature of the 1955 property cases spreads from adverse
possession to trespass, with only two cases presenting relatively
similar factual and legal situations. In one case concerning joint
bank accounts a new trend is visible; the other cases merely re-
affirm well settled principles. One or two cases present unique,
once-in-a-lifetime factual situations which make for enjoyable as
well as instructive reading.
Adverse Possession. Virginia's sole adverse possession case1
of 1955 involved an interpretation of the State's philosophy re-
garding the forfeiture of land for tax delinquency. The land in-
volved had been occupied adversely for more than forty years
and the parties who so held the land brought a suit to quiet title.
They were met with the defense on the part of the record owner
that his own failure to pay taxes upon the land had resulted in the
forfeiture of said land to the Commonwealth, thus breaking the
continuity of possession. In affirming the lower court's decision
in favor of the adverse possessor the Court elucidated the evolu-
tion of Virginia's modem view of tax forfeiture; the court ex-
pressly stated that Armstrong v. Morrill2 which interpreted an
1835 tax statute was inapplicable. The Armstrong case held that
a forfeiture of land to the state constituted a break in the con-
tinuity of possession requisite for adverse possession even though
the land in question was later redeemed.
The Court in an instructive manner pointed out that the
state's former policy of actual forfeiture for tax delinquency was
a matter of necessity, for the state in its earlier history was "land
rich" but "tax poor" and by forfeiture the land could be placed in
the hands of a "paying" taxpayer. The Court, citing C. J. S.3
with approval, stated that Virginia has long allied itself with the
view that where there is no forfeiture of title in fact but a per-
manent lien instead, that there is no breach in continuity of pos-
session. In passing, the Court pointed out that it did not lie in the
mouth of the defendant to seize upon his own tax negligence to
1 Thomas v. Young, 196 Va. 1166, 87 S-E.2d 127 (1955).
2 Armstrong v. Morrill, 14 Wall (U.S.) 120, 20 L.Ed. 765 (1871).
3 2 C.J.S., Adverse Possession, S 152(e) (1936).
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profit by the non-running of the statute of limitations against the
State, thus benefiting himself alone, for the State was not a party
to the suit.
Covenants. The Virginia Reports are replete with cases in-
volving covenants for support in which realty is deeded away by
grantors. Stroch v. MacNicbol 4 forms an exceptional case of this
type upon the extreme facts presented. Although the lower court
refused a rescission of the conveyance, the Supreme Court held
that a material breach of the covenant for support, which was the
major consideration, entitled the grantor to a recission. Upon the
facts of the case no other decision was possible. The grantor, an
artistic and cultured lady of eighty, conveyed her home, valued
at around $25,000, to her sister in return for support and main-
tenance. In the course of time discord arose and the younger
sister ceased to feed or care for her grantor and in addition forced
her to perform unseemly household chores and publicly insulted
her in the presence of her art students. During a period of ill-
ness the younger sister left Mrs. Stroch in bed for several days
without feeding her or administering to her needs-friends came
in to care for her.
The court in granting a recission said that in the light of the
blood relationship and the mode of life of the parties that the
"evidence must be justly weighed and the covenant liberally con-
strued in favor of the grantor." 5
Two cases involving covenants which were restraints on use
occurred last year; in both instances the covenants were upheld.
In one case0 a grantee without notice of the covenant sought to
have it set aside as a restraint on alienation-a ground which the
court said was not well founded-or in the alternative because it
did not pertain to land retained by the grantor but to land con-
veyed. The court held the covenant to be personal, hence the
second ground was inapplicable. The covenant involved the use
of hotel-theater property, the theater occupying one-sixth of the
building area. The grantors forbade the use of the theater por-
tion as a theater except with their consent. Previously they had
4 196 Va. 734, 85 S.E2d 263 (1955).
5 Id. at 744.6 Carneal v. Kendig, 196 Va. 605, 85 S.E2d 235 (1955).
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enjoyed a theater monopoly in the town and wished to continue
to do so although they were shifting the area of their operations
to a new building. Under these circumstances the court found no
reasonable restraint of trade or use of the hotel-theater property.
The second case7 involved a declaratory judgment action in-
stituted to ascertain the rights of assignees of the original covenan-
tor and covenantee of a 1921 restrictive covenant. Plaintiff's as-
signor-covenantor agreed not to operate a wood pulp business
upon certain Hopewell property (consisting of 389 acres in the
hands of the present plaintiff) in order to assure an adequate sup-
ply of pine pulp to the defendant's assignor. The plaintiff
bought the land with notice of the original covenant.
The Court refused to pass on whether or not the covenant
ran with the land, saying that in any event it was an enforceable
equitable right. The Court cited a long line of its own cases in
which it had ruled in favor of enforcement when the covenant
was reasonable when made and not against public policy even
though the covenant might be detrimental to one of the im-
mediate parties.
Damages. From the human interest angle Mac Pherson v.
Green8 is possibly the most engrossing personal property case of
the year. The background of the case involves bitter political
rivalry, "name-calling" complete with unkind publications of
slanted material, a lost election, and a resulting suit in detinue.
The party who lost the election sued the winner to recover a
letter and damages for the unethical use thereof by the victorious
party. The Court treated the action as a motion for judgment
under the New Rules. Plaintiff claimed $10,000 damages without
specifically stating his grounds for so doing and also sought
$50,000 in special damages. The latter was struck from the plead-
ings upon the defendant's motion. Following this action the
plaintiff sought and received a change of venue upon his affidavit
that he "believed" he would not be given a fair trial in the
vicinity of the original controversy. The Court held this to be
error-no proof was given that a fair trial could not be had.
7Hercules Co. v. Continental Can, 196 Va. 945, 86 S.E.2d 128 (1955).
8 197 Va. 27, 87 S.E.2d 785 (1955).
The lower court awarded a verdict in favor of the plaintiff,
granting him the return of the letter and $300 damages, said
damages being a compensation for plaintiff's expense in publishing
a refutation to the implied charges made against him by the
wrongful initial publishing of the letter. Upon appeal the Court
held that plaintiff was entitled only to the return of his letter
saying:
To allow recovery for damages flowing from wrongful
publication of the letter would be to convert the plaintiff's
action of detinue into one for defamation of character or for
libel and slander for words written or spoken of a candidate
for public office, in which action the issues would bear no
relationship to those in a detinue action.9
Aside from the wealth of human wisdom to be gleaned by
"readincr between the lines" of this case, the case is instructive
along procedural lines. Further, the Court politely but firmly
reprimands the parties for pursuing their grievances through the
legal machinery of the state and indicates its disapproval by
dividing the costs both in the trial court and the Supreme Court.
In passing the Court had this to say:
We have not previously read a court procedure like it. We
hope that we shall not have to do so again. It was far re-
moved from the order and dignity that should attend the
judicial process in its effort to find the truth and establish
justice. 10
Virginia had one other case involving damages in the last
calendar year-Preston Mining Company v. Matney.n1 This case
represented a second cycle of litigation between the same parties;
prior litigation determined that the Company had no right to
use a private road of Matney's in coal hauling operations. The
present litigation involved the measure of damages which Matney
could recover for such use after the parties had agreed by con-
tract to let the use continue during the prior litigation which at
one stage involved a temporary injunction. The trial court
awarded damages on the theory that the defendant was a tres-
9 197 Va. 27, 33, 87 S.E.2d 785, 789 (1955).
10 Id. at 31, 87 S.E.2d at 789.
11197 Va. 520, 90 S.E.2d 155 (1955).
passer following the ascertainment of the rights of the parties.
The Supreme Court in reversing and remanding stated that the
defendant was an "occupant by consent" and that the proper
measure of damages was the fair value of the use, not the actual
damage done the property as per defendant's contention.
From this it can be seen that the Court adopted its own
standard for settling the damages and refused to adopt either the
plaintiff's or defendant's view. Under the plaintiff's view the
measure of damages would have been "the fair and reasonable
value of the benefits received by the defendant by reason of its
use of the road." 12
Easements. Two cases, each involving a different type of
easement, were presented to the Supreme Court last year; a third
case was presented in the U. S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
One of the former might be termed a nuisance suit.13 Following
personal differences the plaintiffs sought an injunction to prohibit
use of a road which defendants or their predecessors had used
continuously since 1909. The lower court refused the injunction,
and the Supreme Court affirmed this action holding that where a
reciprocal (though unrecorded) easement appurtenant was cre-
ated by grant that there was no need to pass upon the issue of
whether or not an easement of necessity existed.
In the other state suit, 14 the issue involved was of much
greater legal significance. The suit was a declaratory judgment
action instituted by the State Highway Commission to ascertain
its right to lower the grade of a rural road without compensating
a water company which would be forced to relocate its pipe line
situate in the roadbed. The pipe line had been installed in 1897
pursuant to an easement granted the water company's predecessor
in interest. The lower court felt that the water company had a
property right which entitled it to compensation. The Supreme
Court reversed this holding and in addition stated that the road
change did not constitute an additional servitude upon the fee
owner of the roadbed, being merely a change in degree.
12 Id. at 523, 90 S.E.2d at 157.
13 Harless v. Malcolm, 197 Va. 56, 87 S.E.2d 817 (1955).14 Anderson v. Water Company, 197 Va. 36, 87 S.E.2d 756 (1955).
The case is recommended for its instructional discussion of
the entire nature of public versus private easements.
The third easement case' 5 arose in the Western District of
Virginia and formed part of the to-be-expected litigation con-
cerning the Kerr Dam and Reservoir construction on the Roanoke
River. The United States brought the initial proceeding to con-
demn flowage easements for intermittent flooding of the land in-
volved, the fee to be left in the owner. The District Court gave
judgment in favor of the landowners whereupon the United
States appealed. Upon appeal the case was reversed on the
measure of damages. The lower court permitted a full fee simple
recovery for the land involved; the Court of Appeals allowed a
recovery of the difference in the value of the land with and with-
out the easement. By way of dictum the Court said that if there
were a future change in the dam the landowners then would be
entitled ,to additional compensation.
Eminent Domain. Having discussed the previous case under
easements, that leaves only one case for consideration under the
eminent domain classification, although both cases are basically
eminent domain ones. Virginia Electric and Power Company v.
Pickett"6 involved the action of condemnation commissioners in
awarding damages for a right of way through the best fields of
two separate farms. The case resulted in a four to two decision
for affirmance, the split occuring over whether or not a quotient
verdict had been reached by the commissioners and whether or
not one of the awards was excessive in the light of the evidence.
The case is most instructive in depicting the framework within
which condemnation commissioners operate and the latitude of
discretion which is accorded them.
Joint Bank Account. There is much confusion and con-
flict throughout the country as to the nature of a joint savings
bank account with survivorship. The Supreme Court of Appeals
was presented with one case" calling for a direct construction of
the problem. The Court in an honest appraisal of the confused
state of the law on this issue said:
15 Uniited States v. 2,648.31 Acres of Land, Etc., 218 Fed.2d 518 (1955).
16 197 Va. 269, 89 S.E.2d 76 (1955).
17 King, Ex'x v. Merryman, Adm'x, 196 Va. 844, 86 S.E.2d 141 (1955).
For more than a half century, the courts of this country
have struggled to discover whether a joint deposit bank ac-
count with an extended right of survivorship, sometimes
called a 'poor man's will', is a gift, a trust, a contract, or
joint tenancy, or a testamentary disposition."'
After this forthright recognition of the problem, however,
the Court refused to take a concrete stand on the issue. Without
adopting any theory of construction which could serve as a
future guide the Court held that the facts did not constitute
sufficient evidence on the part of the deceased joint tenant to
indicate an intent of survivorship.
It is respectfully submitted that the Court in this instance
made an equitable factual decision, but left the responsibility for
creating necessary presumptions in this type of case at the legis-
lature's door.
Lease. In a declaratory judgment actioni" involving the
right to remove heavy industrial improvements from realty the
Court was called upon to construe the terms of an ambiguous
lease. The Court admitted extrinsic evidence to ascertain the
intent of the parties as expressed in two ambiguous instruments of
contract. The Court listed three possibilities: a lease, a lease
with option to purchase, or a contract of conditional sale of realty.
After holding a conditional sale of realty was the original intent
of the parties, the Court reversed and remanded the case for dis-
tribution of the improvements according to the tenor of the con-
tract, not according to the law of fixtures.
Partition. Three partition cases arose last year; two of
which involved reference to statutory requirements20 essential to
the validity of sales in lieu of partition. By statute courts of
equity are given jurisdiction to decree the sale of land involved
in a partition suit only after it has been judicially determined
that partition in kind is not feasible.
In one case after finding partition in kind was practical the
lower court nevertheless permitted the sale of the half interest
1s Id. at 849, 86 S.E.2d at 143.
19 Boiling v. Hawthorne Coal and Coke Company, 197 Va. 554, 90 S.E.2d
159 (1955).
2
o Va. Code S8-690 and S8-692 (1950).
of a party who had become non compos mentis during the litiga-
tion, said party being represented by a guardian ad litem. Sub-
sequent conveyances occurred. The instant suitpl was instituted
to attack the decree collaterally; in this action the lower court
sustained a demurrer, but the Supreme Court reversed and re-
manded on the grounds that the sale was void, for there had been
non-compliance with the pertinent statutes. The Court states
two pre-requisites to a sale: (1) record evidence that partition is
not conveniently possible, and (2) proof that the interest of the
partition parties will be advanced by such a sale.
The case of Nickels v. Nicels22 affirmed a lower court de-
cision ordering a sale of a small farm when partition in kind was
found impossible, 3 although an attempt had been made to divide
it-two separate commissions had been appointed. The Court
stated that every partition suit turned upon the issue of whether
or not partition could be "conveniently made" and that the second
step of sale "turned upon the judicial determination from the
record" 24 that such was the fact.
... [T] he power of the court to allot part of the land and
sell the residue or to sell the entire subject and distribute the
proceeds is dependent upon the further judicial determina-
tion from the record that "the interest of those who are en-
titled to the subject or its proceeds will be promoted" by
such disposition.25
The third partition suit" involved a family dispute between
two brothers and a sister who inherited two adjoining lots from
their mother. For a period of years the three acted as joint
owners and in unison executed a note for necessary repairs.
After repeated insistence upon partition, one brother came for-
ward with a 1919 writing by which allegedly his parents had
deeded him one lot outright for a stated consideration of $5,000.
The evidence was most conflicting as to the genuineness of the
document; it was held that there was no merit to the claim of
21 Cauthorn v. Cauthorn, 196 Va. 614, 85 S.E.2d 256 (1955).
22 197 Va. 498, 90 S.E.2d 116 (1955).
2 The land consisted of 22.5 acres of land, much of which was steep, rocky
terrain and there was but one dwelling house upon the land.
24 197 Va. 498 at 502, 90 S.E.2d 116 at 118.
25 1d.
2 0 Reese v. Reese, 196 Va. 1028, 87 S.E.2d 133 (1955).
equitable sole ownership of the one lot, and the lower court's
judgment was affirmed.
Trespass. The one trespass case 27 of the year presented an
entertaining factual situation: a landowner and a fisherman dis-
agreed over the right of the latter to fish in a stream flowing
through the former's property. The fisherman claimed the right
to fish on the theory that the stream was navigable and the prop-
erty of the Commonwealth. The landowner claimed that the
stream was non-navigable which meant that he owned the bed as
a riparian owner. The landowner traced his title to a colonial
grant recorded between 1749 and 1751, said grant including ovu n-
ership to "rivers, waters and wattr courses." Since Virginia has
not expressly changed the common law ownership to bed of
streams so as to affect grants made prior to 1802 in the western
part of the State, the situs of the disputed stream, the landowner
prevailed. The fisherman failed to carry the burden of proof
that the stream was navigable. The landowner was granted a
permanent injunction, thus giving him adequate relief against the
party who insisted he intended to fish the stream when the lower
court offered to save him the expense of defending the suit if he
would agree to desist from his trespass.
Summary. The property cases of 1955 show no distinct new
trends, but rather reiterate basic doctrines as would be expected
in an older settled state, long conscious of property rights. It is
interesting to note that the range of doctrines presented by the
case material stretched from the English common law doctrine
concerning non-navigable waterbed rights to modern statutes con-
cerning partitioning of land.
It is to be expected that all the issues before the court in the
past year may be presented by new parties as the future unfolds.
It is respectfully submitted that the joint bank account case may
be the focal point either of new legislation or of litigation which
will necessitate a growth in the law.
John Lee Darst
27Boerner v. McCallister, 197 Va. 169, 89 S.E.2d 23 (1955).
